Mechanism design with limited commitment
WebJun 2, 2024 · We study mechanism design with limited commitment. In each period, a principal offers a "spot" contract to a privately informed agent without committing to future contracts. In contrast to the classical model with a fixed information structure, we allow for all admissible information structures. We represent the information structure as a ... WebAug 25, 2024 · A cornerstone of our methodology is the idea that a mechanism should encode not only the rules that determine the allocation, but also the information the designer obtains from the interaction with the agent. Therefore, how much the designer learns, which is the key tension in design with limited commitment, becomesan explicit part of the …
Mechanism design with limited commitment
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WebWe develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for mechanism design with limited commitment. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the payoffs of any equilibrium in a mechanism-selection game between an uninformed designer and a privately informed agent. WebJul 28, 2024 · Therefore, how much the designer learns, which is the key tension in design with limited commitment, becomes an explicit part of the design. Our result simplifies the search for the designer-optimal outcome by reducing the agent's behavior to a series of participation, truth telling, and Bayes' plausibility constraints the mechanisms must satisfy.
WebAug 25, 2024 · Limited Commitment: Mechanism Design Meets Information Design Abstract We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism … WebIndeed, mechanism design problems with limited com- mitment are di cult to analyze without imposing auxiliary assumptions either on the class of contracts the designer can …
Webdesign with limited commitment. The authors restrict attention to mechanisms such that the cardinality of the set of input and output messages is the same, and ϕis such that, WebJul 1, 2024 · Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment Econometrica CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Authors: Laura Doval Vasiliki Skreta University College London Abstract We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle...
WebABSTRACT We study the role of information structures in mechanism design problems with limited commitment. In each period, a principal offers a ''spot'' contract to a privately …
WebNov 1, 2000 · We consider mechanism design problems with n agents when the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to an allocation function. With a single agent (n=1) optimal mechanisms can always be represented by direct mechanisms, under which each agent’s message set is the set of his possible types [Bester, H., Strausz, R., 2000.Contracting with … two 3 solutionsWebJul 1, 2024 · Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment Econometrica CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Authors: Laura Doval Vasiliki Skreta University College London Abstract We develop a tool … two40teaWebTherefore, how much the designer learns, which is the key tension in design with limited commitment, becomes an explicit part of the design. Our result simplifies the search for … two 3x3 matrix multiplicationWebDec 3, 2024 · Abstract We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for mechanism design with limited commitment. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich … two42 college ministryWebTherefore, how much the designer learns, which is the key tension in design with limited commitment, becomes an explicit part of the design. Our result simplifies the search for the designer-optimal outcome by reducing the agent's behavior to a series of participation, truthtelling, and Bayes' plausibility constraints the mechanisms must satisfy. two 401k plans contribution rulesWebRevelation principlefor mechanism design with limited commitment. We study a game between an uninformed designer and an informed agent with persistent private … two40three bar and grillWebAuctions with Limited Commitment by Qingmin Liu, Konrad Mierendorff, Xianwen Shi and Weijie Zhong. Published in volume 109, issue 3, pages 876-910 of American Economic … two 403b providers